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ENTRY 
This matter came on for hearing before the oil and Gas 
Board of Review (the "Board") upon timely notice of appeal filed 
herein under date of August 12, 1992, by the Appellants appealing 
from an order of the Chief of the Division of oil and Gas (the 
"Chief") denying a request by Appellants for a mandatory pooling 
order. (See "Chief's Order" attached hereto as Appendix 1). 
This matter was submitted to the Board upon the aforementioned 
notice of appeal and evidence presented at a hearing before the 
Board on October 22, 1992 at the offices of the Department of 
Natural Resources, 4435 Fountain Square, Columbus, Ohio. 
I. Findings of Fact 
1. The Chief's Order 92-216 is an Order denying the 
request of Appellants Transcontinental oil & Gas, Inc. and Cutter 
oil company for mandatory pooling under Section 1509.27 of the 
Ohio Revised Code. 
2. During 1991, Appellants contacted landowners in 
Bath Township of summit County, Ohio to obtain non-drilling and 
drilling leases for the purpose of forming a unit upon which an 
oil and gas well could be drilled to a depth of approximately 
3,900'. Of the landowners contacted, only eight were willing to 
grant such leases: Cross and Maria D. DiTommaso; James V. and 
Donna J. McCann; Anthony Olivo; steven C. and Janice A. 
Brandvoid; Patrick H. and Diana s. McCullum; Salvatore J. and 
Karen L. Cicerello; Daniel J. Vargo; and Gillum Doolittle Trust. 
3. In November, 1991 permit no. 2736 was issued for 
the drilling of the DiTommaso No.1 Well (the "Well"), which was , 
to be drilled on the voluntary unit formed by the Appellants (the 
"DiTommaso Unit"). 
4. One non-drilling lease included in the DiTommaso 
unit was obtained (a lease for 13.48 acres) from Richard S. 
Amundsen, Vice President of National city Bank and Trustee of the 
Gillum H. Doolittle Trust (the "Doolittle Lease"). The entire 
acreage included in the Doolittle Lease underlies Interstate 77. 
Prior to obtaining the Doolittle Lease from Mr. Amundsen, 
Appellants had received a certificate of title indicating 
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ownership of the Doolittle property covered by the Doolittle 
Lease was held by the Doolittle Trust of which Mr. Amundsen was 
the trustee. 
5. At the time Appellants applied for their drilling 
permit, when such permit was issued and when they drilled, 
Appellants believed they had full interest in a voluntarily 
pooled unit. They had no reason to believe that mandatory 
pooling was needed. 
6. In February, 1992, Appellants commenced the 
drilling of the Well. When Appellants had drilled three quarters 
of the way to total depth, they were notified by National City 
Bank that it had concerns regarding its authority to grant the 
Doolittle Lease. 
7. Those parties filing appearances in Appeal No. 510 
as interested parties, Bruce Doolittle and Philene Engle 
("Interested parties"), had asserted they owned an interest in 
the Doolittle property and challenged the authority of the 
• 
Trustee to grant the Doolittle Lease. 
8. Appellants completed drilling of the Well to total 
depth (approximately 3,900') and set casing in the Well to 
protect it. Appellants delayed completion of the Well until they 
could resolve the dispute regarding the Doolittle Lease. 
9. The location of the Well is less than 300' feet 
from the boundary of the Doolittle Lease. 
10. Appellants made several attempts to obtain a lease 
from the Interested Parties and to voluntarily pool the interests 
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claimed by the Interested Parties in the Doolittle Lease. These 
offers included payment of $5,000 to each Interested Party as a 
signing bonus for a lease of their asserted rights in the 
Doolittle Lease and decreasing the total acreage which would be 
included in a voluntary unit. The decrease in total acreage in 
the voluntary unit would effectively increase the Doolittle 
royalty share of the unit. 
11. All offers presented to the Interested Parties 
were rejected. 
12. Upon failure to obtain a lease or voluntary 
pooling from the Interested Parties, the Appellants filed a 
request for a mandatory pooling order with the Division. At the 
time the Appellants' request for a mandatory pooling order was 
filed, the Well was drilled to total depth and casing was set. 
Further, Appellants were "owners" as defined in Chapter 1509. 
The mandatory pooling application filed by Appellants requested 
inclusion of 3.067 acres located in the southernmost portion of 
\ 
the Doolittle property, which was the minimum acreage needed from 
the Doolittle Lease to make the unit of sufficient shape to 
create a legal drilling unit. 
13. The request for a mandatory pooling order was 
heard by the Technical Advisory Committee ("TAC") of the Division 
on June 15, 1992. 
14. The TAC recommended to the Chief that the request 
for mandatory pooling be approved with the following provisions: 
i) the Doolittle acreage pool portions be comprised of 3.067 
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acres; ii) the unit size be limited to and not exceed 24 acres in 
total size; and iii) the standard pay-out provision of 150% cost 
recovery be used. 
15. On July 29, 1992, the Chief denied Appellants 
request for mandatory pooling. 
16. The appeal of Chief's Order 92-16 was timely filed 
by Appellants. 
II. Issues Presented 
The following questions were presented for 
consideration by the Board: 
1. Is the Chief's Order denying Appellants' 
application for a mandatory pooling order for drilling unit 
requirements for the drilling of the Ditommaso No. 1 Well lawful 
and reasonable? 
2. In the event the Chief's Order is unlawful and 
unreasonable, and therefore should be vacated, is there an order 
that this Board will make? 
III. The Applicable Law 
In determining whether the Chief's Order is lawful and 
reasonable, this Board must consider whether such Order is in 
accordance with the law and whether there is a valid factual 
foundation for such Order. See, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Maynard, 22 Ohio App.3d 3 (Franklin County ct. App. 1984). 
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Addressing first whether the Chief's Order is in 
accordance with the law, this Board in Jerry Moore. Inc. v. state 
of Ohio, Appeal No. 1 (Ohio oil and Gas Board of Review, 1966) 
established two conditions precedent under ORC 1509.27 for an 
owner to make application to the Division of oil and Gas for a 
mandatory pooling order: i) that a tract of land of insufficient 
size or shape to meet the requirements for drilling a well 
thereon as provided in ORC 1509.24 or 1509.25 exists; and ii) the 
owner has been unable to form a drilling unit under agreement 
provided in ORC 1509.26, on a just and equitable basis. Id. at 
16. 
section 1509.24 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that 
the Chief may adopt rules relative to minimum acreage and 
distance requirements for drilling units. section 1501:9-1-
04(C) (3) of the Ohio Administrative Code requires that a well 
drilled to a depth of two thousand to four thousand feet must be 
drilled on a unit containing no less than 20 acres, may be no 
closer than 600 feet from any well drilled, producing or capable 
of producing from the same pool and may be no closer than 300 
feet from any boundary of the subject drilling unit. If the 
Doolittle Lease is not included, the existing borehole would not 
be 300' from the boundary. Therefore, the unit would be of 
insufficient shape. 
The Interested Parties submitted evidence that the 
DiTommaso unit contained a location other than where the Well was 
drilled which would comply with the requirements of §1501:9-1-
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04. This evidence, however, ignored that the Well was in fact 
drilled and was drilled in good faith belief that the Appellants 
owned the Doolittle Lease. without the inclusion of some portion 
of the Doolittle Lease, the Well does not meet the spacing 
requirements of §§1509.24 and 1501:9-1-04. Thus, Appellants' 
application for mandatory pooling met the first condition 
precedent. 
Appellants presented testimony that they offered to 
lease and/or voluntarily pool the mineral rights which the 
Interested Parties asserted they owned. Such offers included 
leasIng or unitizing the entire 13.8 acres with payment of a 
$5,000 lease bonus to each Interested Party, royalty payments in 
the event of a lease or production payments and a right to 
participate in the Well in the event of a voluntary pooling. The 
offers also provided for a revision of the DiTommaso unit to 
retain the entire 13.8 acres in the Doolittle property while 
reduc.ing the total acreage in the Unit, thereby increasing the 
share of royalty payment for the Doolittle property. The 
Interested Parties presented no evidence as to why they believed 
these offers were not just and equitable. 
This Board has previously addressed the "reasonable 
efforts" required to voluntarily pool prior to an application for 
mandatory pooling. The Board stated "[u]sing "all reasonable 
efforts" contemplates both a reasonable offer and sufficient 
efforts to advise the other owner or owners of same." Jerry 
Moore, Inc. at 19. Based upon the testimony and other evidence 
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and the findings set forth herein, this Board is of the opinion 
that Appellants did make all reasonable efforts to voluntarily 
pool, and therefore, complied with the second condition precedent 
to make application to the Division for a mandatory pooling 
order. 
Once the conditions precedent have been met, the Chief 
is to issue the mandatory pooling order, if he is satisfied the 
application is in proper form and mandatory pooling is necessary 
to protect correlative rights or to provide effective 
development, use or conservation of oil and gas. Correlative 
rights is defined in §1509.01 as the reasonable opportunity to 
recover oil and gas under tracts without having to drill 
unnecessary wells or incur unnecessary expense. The Chief 
testified that wells in existence around the Well would deplete 
the resources of the tract at issue. The mandatory pooling 
application requested inclusion of 3.067 acres in the 
southernmost portion of the Doolittle property. That acreage is 
the minimum necessary to make the existing Well a legal unit. It 
also leaves 10 contiguous acres which could be pooled by the 
owners of the Doolittle property to comprise half of another 20 
acre unit. Therefore, the mandatory pooling order recommended by 
the TAC protects and maximizes both the Appellants and Interested 
Parties correlative rights. If mandatory pooling is not allowed, 
Appellants, as "owners" of the tracts (as defined in §1509.01), 
will not have the opportunity to recover oil and gas under their 
tracts without drilling unnecessary wells or at unnecessary 
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expense. Therefore, the Appellants correlative rights will be 
harmed without the mandatory pooling. 
Appellee and the Interested Parties raised the argument 
that a request for mandatory pooling must be made at the time of 
application for the permit to drill. Appellee's witness 
testified that when a well which originally met all spacing 
requirements is to be deepened and such deepening will result in 
additional spacing requirements, mandatory pooling may be used if 
needed to meet the new spacing requirements. The purpose of 
mandatory pooling is to promote effective use of our state's 
natural resources and to protect the correlative rights of all 
interested parties. 
These Appellants believed they had proper leases. 
Appellants exercised due diligence of a reasonably prudent 
operator by confirming that belief with a title opinion. Thus, 
the site selection of the Well, when drilled, was reasonable and 
prude~t. After material resources had been committed to the 
Well, a previously unknown interestholder refused numerous and 
reasonable offers to lease or be pooled. Without a grant of 
mandatory pooling, that refusal would cause the other interested 
parties economic loss and loss of correlative rights. These 
Appellants have as much economic and logistic difficulties as an 
applicant who would be deepening a well. To distinguish the fact 
of this case from a "deepening" case would be an arbitrary and 
unreasonable distinction. 
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IV. Order 
Based upon the applicable law and the facts submitted 
and giving due consideration to conservation and correlative 
rights as applicable in this Appeal, the Board hereby makes the 
following order: 
1994. 
i) The Board vacates Chief's Order No. 92-216 and finds 
that such Order was unlawful and unreasonable. 
ii) The Board makes the followinq order which it finds the 
Chief should have made: 
The Chief shall issue a mandatory poolinq order in 
compliance with the recommendations of the TAC 
effective as of the date of execution by the Chief. 
Such order shall include the followinq exception: the 
sharinq of production and adjustment of the oriqinal 
costs of drillinq, equippinq and completinq the Well 
shall be from the effective date of the mandatory 
poolinq order issued. 
This Entry and Order effective this 20th day of January, 
recused due to conflict 
Benita Kahn, Secretary 
012094/00290229 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true copy of 
the foregoing was served on Kenneth Gibson, 234 Portage Trail, 
P.O. Box 535, CUyahoga Falls, Ohio 44222, Mr. Ray Studer, 
Division of oil and Gas, 4435 Fountain Square, Bldg. A, Columbus, 
Ohio 43224 and Daniel Plumly, P.O. Box 488, 225 North Market 
Street, Wooster, Ohio 44691-0488 by certified mail, postage 
prepaid, this JIst day of January, 1994. 
~& Benita Kahn 
012194/00290229 
-11-
ASSOCIATED 
LAW OFFICES 
WEICK. GIBSON & LOWRY 
234 WEST PORTAGE TRAIL 
CUYAHOGA FALLS. OHIO 
44221 
(216) 929-0507 
BEFORE THE OIL AND GAS BOARD OF REVIEW 
DIVISION OF OIL AND GAS 
STATE OF OHIO 
TRAKSCONTINENTAL OIL & 
GAS, IKC., et a1. 
Appellants 
vs. 
DONALD L. MASON, CHIEF 
DIVISION OF OIL AND GAS 
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
Appellee 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APPEAL NO. 510 
Chief's Order 92-216 
NOTICE OF APPEAL BY 
INTERESTED PARTIES 
TO COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO 
Now comes Bruce Doolittle and Philene Engel "the 
'interested parties" in the proceedings below and hereby give 
notice of their appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, Franklin 
County, Ohio from the decision of the Oil and Gas Board of 
Review in Appeal No. 510 reversing the decision of the Chief of 
the Division of Oil and Gas and granting the Appellants I 
application for Mandatory pooling. The order was issued and 
effective as of January 20, 1994 and this appeal is timely 
made. This appeal is on both questions of law and fact and is 
made pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 1509.37. 
ASSOCIAtED 
LAW OFFICES 
WEICK. GleSON & LOWRY 
234 WEST PORTAGE TRAIL 
CUYAHOGA FALLS. OHIO 
44221 
(216) 929-0507 
The Board is requested to prepare and file a complete 
record of its proceedings within 15 days as required by law. 
By: 
WEICK, GIBSON & LOWRY 
.~ KENNETH L. GIBSON 
Attorney for Interested Parties 
1. D. *0018885 
234 Portage Trail 
P.O. Box 535 
Cuyahoga Falls, OH 44222 
(216) 929-0507 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing motion was sent this 
25th day of January, 1994 to the following: 
Donald L. Mason 
Chief Division of Oil and Gas 
Dept. of Natural Resources 
4435 Fountain Square, Bldg A. 
Columbus, Ohio 43224-1387 
Ray Studer 
Asst. Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
4435 Fountain Square 
Bldg A 
Columbus OH 43224 
Daniel H. Plumly 
Attorney for Appellees 
Transcontinental Oil & Gas 
and Cutter Oil Company 
P.O. Box 488 
Wooster, Ohio 44691-0488 
Benita Kahn, Secretary 
Oil & Gas Board of Review 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and 
Pease 
52 East Gay Street 
P.O. Box 1008 
Columbus, OH 43216-1008 
KENNETH L. GIBSON 
Attorney for Interested Parties 
Bruce Doolittle and Philene Engel 
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CIVIL DIVISION 
FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO 
BRUCE DOOLITTLE, et al. 
Appellants 
v. 
TRANSCONTINENTAL OIL & GAS, INC., 
et al. 
Appellees 
Case No. 94 CVF 02 839 
Judge J. Bessey 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Now come Appellees, Transcontinental Oil & Gas, Inc., and Cutter Oil 
Company, and move this Honorable Court to dismiss the appeal of Bruce 
Doolittle and Philene Engel, as they are not real parties in interest and 
have no standing to bring this appeal, and because National City Bank's 
motion to intervene filed 72 days after the order of the Oil and Gas 
Board of Review was entered does not constitute a timely perfected notice 
of appeal pursuant to either Revised Code Section 119.12 or Revised Code 
Section 1509.37. A memorandum in support of this motion is attached. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRITCHFIELD, CRITCHFIELD 
& JOHNS ON 
usan E. Ba r 
Ohio Sup. t. #0059569 
Attorney for Appellees, 
Transcontinental Oil & Gas, 
Inc., and Cutter Oil Company 
CRITCHFIELD. 
CRITCHFIELD 
& JOHNSTON 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
22!" NO~TH MARKET STREET 
I' O. BOX 48B 
Wi... '::R. OH 4469 I w0488 
12161 264-4444 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
Statement of the Facts. 
The property in question in this dispute is a 13 .48 acre parcel of 
land located in Bath Township. Summit County. Ohio ("Doolittle 
Property"). In January of 1973. this property was titled in the name of 
Gillum H. Doolittle ("G. H. Doolittle"). Bruce Doolittle and Philene 
Engel's father (hereinafter "Doolittle" and "Engel"). G. H. Doolittle 
died testate on January 24. 1973. G. H. Doolittle's Last Will and 
Testament provided that Akron National Bank & Trust Company nka National 
City Bank ("NCB") was to be and remains the co-executor under the Will 
and the trustee of the G. H. Doolittle Trust ("Trust") The Will 
provided that all property owned by G. H. Doolittle vested at the time of 
his death in NCB. A copy of the Will is attached hereto and made a part 
hereof as Exhibit 1 The terms of the Trust provide for three 
beneficiaries, Bruce Doolittle, Philene Engel, and a separate trust for 
G. H. Doolittle's two grandsons. Legal title to the Doolittle Property 
vested in NCB at the time of G. H. Doolittle's death. At the time the 
inventory of the estate was filed, the Doo1i tt1e Property was 
inadvertently excluded from the inventory. 
Sometime in April of 1991. NCB became aware of the Doolittle Property 
and thereafter began negotiations with agents of Transcontinental Oil & 
Gas. Inc.. and Cutter Oil Company (hereinafter collectively referred to 
as "Transcontinental") for the leasing of the Doolittle Property for the 
purpose of composing a unit on which to drill an oil and gas well On or 
about December 12. 1991, NCB, as trustee, entered into a nondrilling oil 
and gas lease with Transcontinental for the Doolittle Property 
The Doolittle Property was unitized with other leases 
Transcontinental had obtained, and in February of 1992 Transcontinental 
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began drilling the DiTommaso Well No 1 After drilling was commenced, 
Doolittle and Engel filed suit in the Summit County Court of Common 
Pleas, claiming a one-third interest each in the property, disputing the 
validity of the lease, and seeking an injunction against further 
production of the well. Transcontinental continued to drill the well to 
total depth; but by agreement of the parties, the well was not completed 
or put into production. The case in Summit County is currently stayed 
pending the outcome of this appeal. 
Transcontinental subsequently requested a mandatory pooling order 
from the Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas of the Ohio Department of 
Natural Resources A hearing was held before the Technical Advisory 
Committee of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil 
and Gas, on June 15, 1992. The Technical Advisory Committee recommended 
to the Chief that Transcontinental's request for mandatory pooling be 
approved with the following provisions' 
1. The Doolittle acreage pool portions be comprised of 3 067 
acres; 
2. The unit size be limited to and not exceed 24 acres in 
total size; and 
3. The standard pay-out provision of 150 percent cost recovery 
be used. 
On July 29, 1992, the Chief issued an order denying Transcontinental's 
request for a mandatory pooling. On August 12, 1992, Transcontinental 
timely appealed from the Chief's order to the Oil and Gas Board of Review 
(hereinafter "Board") A hearing was held on October 22, 1992, before 
the Board. Appearances were made at that hearing by Doolittle and Engel 
as "interested persons" through their counsel, Kenneth Gibson. On 
January 20, 1994, the Board reversed the order of the Chief and granted 
Transcontinental's request for a mandatory pooling order, including 3 067 
acres of the Doolittle Property Although NCB did not appear as an 
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interested person at the hearing before the Board, they were made aware 
of all the administrative proceedings by counsel for Trans cont inentaL-
When the order of the Board was issued on January 20, 1994, a copy of 
that order was sent via facsimile transmission to NCB's counsel of record 
in the Summit County case. (See Affidavit of Susan E. Baker attached 
hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit 2 and Affidavit of Daniel H. 
Plumly attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit 3.) 
Law. 
The court should dismiss the appeal of Doolittle and Engel because 
they have no standing to bring this cause of action, They were not 
parties to the administrative adjudicative hearing before the Board. 
Pursuant to Revised Code Section 1509.37, only parties may appeal from an 
Order of the Board. Parties are specifically defined by Revised Code 
Section 1509.36 and Ohio Administrative Code Section 1509-1-14 as the 
appellant from the Chief's order and the Chief. Their appearance as 
"interested persons" before the Board does not bootstrap them into 
standing as a party The specific provisions of Revised Code Section 
1509.37 and Section 1509.36 should prevail over the general provisions of 
appeals from state administrative agencies set forth in Revised Code 
Section 119.01. Revised Code Section 1. 21. 
Even under the general provisions of Revised Code Section 119 01(A), 
which defines a "party", Doolittle and Engel have no standing to appeal 
Revised Code Section 119 01 defines "party" as the "person whose 
interests are the subject of an adjudication by an agency." Doolittle 
and Engel, by their own admission, have only an equitable title to some 
portion of the Doolittle Property The Trust holds legal title to the 
property and the trustee is the only person who can enter into an oil and 
gas lease which transfers the mineral rights of the property 
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[WJhere the testator devises real estate to a trustee, the 
trustee upon his appointment takes title thereto which relates 
back to the date of the death of the testator, and such trustee 
is entitled to collect rents and profits from the real estate 
after the death of the testator . 
Barlow v. The Winters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co .. Trustee, 145 Ohio 
St. 270, 276 (1945). 
Absolute legal title vests in the trustee of a trust. The equitable 
title to real property vests in the beneficiaries of a trust. Finkbeiner 
v. Finkbeiner, III Ohio App 64 (Hamilton Co. 1959). Only the legal 
interests of the trustee and its ability to enter into an oil and gas 
lease for the Doolittle Property will be affected by the outcome of any 
appeal from the Board's Order 
Doolittle and Engel's interests will be indirectly affected by the 
amount of royalties the Trust is able to collect They have no legal 
interest to form a lease which would be directly affected by the order 
They have only an equitable interest in the proceeds of the lease 
Because they have no legal interest which will be directly affected, 
Doolittle and Engel are not the real parties in interest, and therefore 
have no standing to appeal. "Every action shall be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest." Civil Rule 17(A). 
'Real party in interest' is one who has a real interest in 
the subject matter of the litigation and not merely an interest 
in the action itself, i. e., one who is directly benefitted or 
injured by the outcome of the case. 
West Clermont Ed. Ass 'n. v. West Clermont Bd. of Ed., 67 Ohio 
App. 2d 160, 162 (Clermont Co. 1980). (emphasis in the original) 
Only Doolittle and Engel's equitable interests in the proceeds of the 
trust will be affected by the outcome of this case, because they have no 
ability to enter a lease for the mineral rights to the Doolittle Property 
As beneficiaries of the Trust, Doolittle and Engel may not bring this 
appeal in their own name A beneficiary to a trust may not bring a cause 
of action in his own name, but must first make a demand upon the 
-5-
CRITCHFIELD. 
CRITCHFIELD 
&-.JOHNSTON 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
~2S NORTH MARKET STREET 
\0. eOX488 
'VO, ~. OH 44691-0488 
trustee. Firestone v Ga1braeth, 976 F 2d 279 (6th Cir. 1992). Only the 
trustee may bring an action on behalf of a trust. Saxton v. Seiberling, 
40 Ohio St. 554 (l891). Doolittle and Engel have not made a demand that 
NCB bring this appeal and they have no standing to bring a civil action 
in their own name. 
Despite the fact that they have no legal interest which is directly 
affected by the order of the Board, Doolittle and Engel have persisted to 
attempt to elevate themselves to the level of a party in both the 
administrative proceedings below and this appeal to a court of law. They 
are not parties as defined by Chapter 1509. They are not parties as 
defined by Chapter 119. They are not the real party in interest pursuant 
to Civil Rule 17(A). They do not even have a financial stake in this 
litigation outside their equitable interests in the proceeds of the Trust 
because, as is reflected in the record at page 124 and 125 of the 
transcript of the hearing before the Board, their legal fees are being 
paid by an oil and gas producer who is also represented by Doolittle and 
Engel's counsel. Doolittle and Engel have no standing to bring this 
appeal and it should be dismissed. 
This appeal should be dismissed because NCB's motion to intervene 
does not constitute a timely perfected notice of appeal. Ohio Revised 
Code Section 119.12 governs generally the appeal of administrative 
rulings and states in pertinent part: 
Any party desiring to appeal shall file a notice of appeal 
wi th the agency setting forth the order appealed from and the 
grounds of his appeal. A copy of such notice of appeal shall 
also be filed by the appellant with the court Unless otherwise 
provided by law relating to a particular agency, such notices of 
appeal shall be filed within 15 days after the mailing of the 
notice of the agency's order as provided in this section. 
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The statutes governing appeals from the Board provide for a longer 
time for filing of a notice of appeal. Ohio Revised Code Section 1509.37 
provides in pertinent part: 
Any party adversely affected by an order of the Oil and Gas 
Board of Review may appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of 
Franklin County. Any party desiring to so appeal shall file 
with the Board a notice of appeal designating the order appealed 
from and stating whether the appeal is taken on questions of law 
or questions of law and fact. A copy of such notice shall also 
be filed by the appellant with the court and shall be mailed or 
otherwise delivered to the appellee. Such notices shall be 
filed and mailed or otherwise delivered within 30 days after the 
date upon which appellant received notice from the Board by 
registered mail of the making of the order appealed from. 
NCB had notice of Transcontinental's appeal from the Chief's denial 
of its mandatory pooling order request Despite this notice, NCB failed 
to appear at the hearing before the Board as an 1nterested person as 
provided for in Administrative Code Section 1509 -1-14 NCB also had 
immediate notice of the order issued by the Board. Although NCB was not 
a party to the appeal and did not appear as an interested person, on 
January 20, 1994, when counsel for Transcontinental received a copy of 
the order of the Board granting its request for mandatory pooling, 
counsel for Transcontinental transmitted via facsimile a copy of the 
Board's order. Despite actual knowledge of all of the administrative 
adjudicative procedures involving this drilling unit, NCB has failed to 
appear as an interested person at either the technical advisory committee 
hearing or the appeal before the Board and did not appeal from the 
Chief's order denying the mandatory pooling order 
NCB has failed to properly perfect an appeal from an order of the 
Board. It has sent no notice to Transcontinental, who is a proper party, 
nor has it sent notice to the Board. NCB has only moved to intervene 72 
days after the order was issued by the Board Such delay should estop 
NCB from exercising any right it may have to app.eal from the Board's 
-7-
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order. NCB cannot circumvent procedure by now deciding to ride in on the 
coattails of Doolittle and Engel who, although they had no standing, did 
at least comply with the statutory requirements to perfect their 
attempted appeal. 
Even if NCB had timely perfected its appeal, NCB does not have 
standing to bring an appeal from this order for the same reasons that 
Doolittle and Engel have no standing. NCB is not a "party" as defined by 
Revised Code Section 1509.36 and Ohio Administrative Code Section 
1509-1-14. Its failure to appeal, even as interested parties, although 
it could have appealed the Chief's order and been a party, indicates its 
intent to waive any administrative remedies it might have employed. Its 
failure to exhaust or even attempt to exercise any of its administrative 
remedies bars it from even the bootstrap argument of Doolittle and Engel 
to establish standing to appeal 
There is a need for closure to adjudication and a need fora point at 
which the parties may rely on the final ruling of the agency Only 
Transcontinental will be prejudiced if the Court denies its motion to 
dismiss this appeal. Doolittle and Engel's equitable interests in the 
proceeds of the Trust are protected in their suit in Summit County Court 
of Common Pleas. Their legal fees are being paid by another client of 
their counsel. 
NCB has affirmatively elected not to participate in the 
administrative proceedings. It has failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies. 
Neither Doolittle nor Engel nor NCB has standlng to bring an appeal 
from the Board's order. NCB, having notice and opportuni ty to appeal 
from the Chief's order waived its opportunity to become a party It 
should not be permitted to use Doolittle and Engel's inappropriate appeal 
-8-
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to toll the statute of limitations on the time in which it could arguably 
have properly perfected an appeal. 
The time has come when Transcontinental should be able to rely upon 
the final administrative adjudicative order of- the Board. Based on the 
foregoing law and argument, this court should dismiss the appeal and 
affirm the order of the Oil and Gas Board of Review granting 
Transcontinental's request for a mandatory pooling order. 
CRITCHFIELD 
Susan E. B 
Ohio Sup. t 
Attorney for Appellees, 
Transcontinental Oil & Gas, 
Inc., and Cutter Oil Company 
P o. Box 488 
Wooster, OH 44691-0488 
Phone. 216/264-4444 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion and Memorandum 
I}J 
of Law was mailed by regular u. S. Mail this ~ day of April, 1994, to 
the following: 
1. Donald L. Mason, Esquire 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Chief Division of Oil and Gas 
Department of Natural Resources 
4435 Fountain Square, Bldg. A 
Columbus, OH 43224-1387 
Ray Studer, Esquire 
Assistant Attorney General 
4435 Fountain square, Bldg. A 
Columbus, OH 43224 
Ms. Benita Kahn, Secretary 
Oil and Gas Board of Review 
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease 
52 East Gay Street 
P.O. Box 1008 
Columbus, OH 43216-1008 
Kenneth L. Gibson, 
Attorney for Bruce 
234 Portage Trail 
P.O Box 535 
Cuyahoga Falls, OH 
Esquire 
Doolittle and Philene Engel 
44222 
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CIVIL DIVISION 
~ DOOLITTLE. et sill 
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) CASE NO. MCVlO2-839 
~aL ] JUDGE BESSEY 
Appellees. 1 
~7 ... \ (,i) 
..,. , --" 
..... , 
. -. 
DECISION -. ,_ .... 
Rendered Ibis ~ ~a1 of November, 1'94. 
Bessey. J. 
This ~a5e is before the Court on an R.C. 11509.37 appeal from the Decision of the 
Oil &: Ou Review Bozmi gmnting a mandatoly pooling order to Appellee. The Boud·s 
Decision reversed the Order of the QUe! of the Division of Oil and Gas which had denied 
the request for mandator)' pooling. 
The Court is confined to the record pxesented at the Board Qcept under the 
following cimunstances: 
liThe court may grant a teQ.uest for the admission of additional evidence when satisfied 
that sucb additional evid~ is newly discovered and could Dot with reasonable diligeQ(;:e 
have been ascertained prior to the hearing befate the board." R.C. flS~.J1. 
The case· file in the within cause contains affldaviES, depositions. ex parte 
communications by letter to the Count and allegations within the briefs which are!neither 
newly discovered nDT contained within the l'Ccord fnun the Board. To a great e~lent they 
~ 1O the Icla~ case pending in Summit County Common Pleas Court between 
. ... 
..~ 
, ~,' 
-
Appellants and Intervenors in rhis case. They complicate the issues 
UDJ~ecessarUy- The only issue. before this Court is whedlcr the Order of th 
Board iJ lawful and r:easonaJ;,le. R.C. '1S09.3'7. For the foUovring reasons 
detennined that it is nol On September 6. 1994. mter\'enor withdrew its a 
The property involved Is located in Bath Township, Ohio. The pOIti 
Board orowed to be pooled is 3.067 acres of It 13.48 acre uaot 'Which w 
GiUum H. Doolittle. DOW~. Doolittle died restate leaving the pro 
chiJchcn and his two grandchildren. Each child (the Appcllams herein) was to xeceive a 
1/3 interest and the gramlchi1dreD ~h received a 1/6 intaest 'Which was to be held in 
wst by the trustee National City Bank (NCB)- However. the title to the property never 
passed to the beneficiaries. but rather was listed as ,till being owned by Doolittle. 
In 1991, Appellee. Transcontinental Oil &: Ga~ Inc. (TOO). sought a lease 
cQooerning oil and gas rights on the Doolirtle property. It was ultimately c:Dlaed into by 
NCB as trustee on ~mbet 12, 1991. NCB did not advise Appellants that they were 
takinl this action. Befote the lease was signed, TOG obtained a permit to drill an oU 
well near &he Doolittle property in anticipation of the execution of the lease. In February, 
1992l th" ~1l was drilled to depth. After the well was sta.rtcd. but before it was drilled 
to total depth. TOO bcame awate that NCB was DOW questioning itS au.thority 10 enter 
in~ the lease a8 trU$tee because Doolittle and Engel (the children of Gillum Doolittle) had 
voiced objec;tions. TOG ~ed to drill to depth" cased. and eapped the weJ1. TOO 
then attempted fo negotiate a ,\,oluntary pooling agreement with Doolittle aDd Engel bu~ 
was unsuccessful. It then appUed for a mandatory pooling order on June IS. 1992. The 
Chief denied the request on July 29, 1992. The Oil & Gas Review Board held its hearing 
2 
on the ob~tions of TOe on October 22, 1992, but did not issue its Order granting the 
mmda~ pooling request until January 21. 1994. 
It.c. ,1509.215Cts out the pren;quisites fw a mandaloty pooling order; 
IIIf a tract of land is of insufficient size or shape to meet the 
requirements fot driDing a well thexeon u provided in 
section 1509.24 or 1$09.25 of the R.evJsed Code, whichever 
is applicable. and th~ owner has been unable for fonn a 
dril1in8 =t under agreement provided in section 1509.26 
of the Jteyised Code. on a just and equitable basis. the 
owner of such rract may make application to the division of 
aU and gas far a mandatoty pooling order. 
Such application shall include such data amI information as 
sball be reasonably required by th~ cbief of the division of 
aU and gas and shall ~ accompanied by an application for 
permit as required by section 1509.05 of the Revised Code. 
The chief shall notify all owners of land within the area 
proposed. to be included within the order of the flling of 
such application and of their tight to a bearing if requested. 
Afict the hearing or after the ex:piration of thirty days from 
th,,, slate notice of application was mailed fa such oVincrs. 
the chief, if satisfied that the applicarion is proper in fann 
and that rnaJld.alOI'y pooling is necessary to protect 
oorrelative rights or to provide effecrive development. usc. 
or conservation of oil and gas, shall issue a dri11iDg pe.anit 
and a mandator)' pooling order complying with the 
requirements for drilling a weD as provided in section 
1509.24 or 1.509.25 of the Revised Code. whichever is 
applicable. which shall: 
(A) Designate the boundaries of the drilling unil within 
which the well shall be drilled; 
(B) Dcsigraate the proposed drilling site; 
(C) Deaaibe each separately owned tnct or pan thereof 
pooled by the orner. 
(0) Allocflte on a &\lJ'faee acreage basis .. pro I.ta portion 
of the production to the ownel at e&ch tract; 
(.6) Designate the pason to whom dle permil shall be 
issued. 
3 
Thus, 'Under the scatole, there are two prerequisites to a mandatot)' pooling order: 
L 'I'h8 tract: of land must be of insufflcie.ut size or shape 
without mcludinl the land sought to be pooled. 
2. The developer must bave been unsuccessful in his 
.ttempts 10 get voluntary pooling agreements. 
]olmso" "', Kel( (1993), " Ohio AJlp.,34 6ZJ. 
The evidence presented to the Board through Mr. Craddock indicated that there 
was another tract at land which TOG had ~viCl1s1)' leased which would have been a site 
which was slJfficient in Jize and &bapc to accommodate the wen. This is the McCann 
property. This should have been the end of the inquiry since the fll'st prerequisite for 
mandatory pooling was not mel 
While the Board in iu opinion recognized the fact that the McCann propertY was 
sufficient in sif.e and shape., it found that ffl(;t to be irrelevant sin~ TOG had alrciUly.gone 
to the expense of drilling the _en on the Doolittle ptopmy. The Board considered the 
site and shape of the u.ct of land on which the well had been drilled without the 
Doolittle ptopeny in granting the mandatory pooling order. This is contrary to the statute 
which requires that the application for mandatory pOQlin1 accompany the permit to drill 
the weU. It was not meant to protect those who drill a well improperly. The Board. 
exceeded its authority in at1empting to mitigate the dama.ges that TOG would surfer. It 
also did not consider the advta'5e effect the ute of only three ~es of the 13 ~ontained 
ill me Doolittle property would have on Appellants. For that teascn alonc. it did not 
pro~t AppellantsS cottelativ8 ripts in violation of the ,raNte. I"h"",tl, 89 Oldo 
Ap,.34 til 621.l&. In fairness to TOO, it did not anticipate needing mandar.ory pooling 
since it believed it had a valid lease with NCB. It was at the point that the Appellants 
4 
questlcmed die iQ6rutit)' of die "usa to c,,"= the lease !hat tbe SlIiIlIDit CettHty ease 
had to have been resolved. That col11t bas the only juxisdiction to decide 'those mattcas 
and the Chief and the Board bod! c"ceeded their &\1thority in eonstderlDg the legali~ of 
the lease. TOG, absent an injunction against usc of the well, could have begun 
production.. There was no need to go to the Chief for a mandatory pooling order since 
TOO already bad existing voluntary leases the invalidit)' of which had not bceu shown. 
The Chief's teStimony lit 1bc hearing before the Board was that he beliC1r'eci there 
'Was a Yalid lease in place a.s executed by the batlk.1 TOG should have operated under 
that premise and ~ontinued drilling or resolved that lawsuit in th~ Summit County 
COlTllUOn Plea! Cotln. The Ollef felt that the prerequisites were not there for mandatory 
drilling since the lease had been cxecllted for the DooUtue property. The Chief should 
DOl have considered the legality of the lease. His only inquiIy should have beenwberher 
or not there was • lease whioh made the tract Jarge enough to preclude mandatory 
pooling. Neither the Board not this Court has an)' jurlsdi~tion to decide the legality of the 
voluntary lease. 1ftat issue has to be resolved in Summit County. Thus. lhe dccfsion of 
dIe Chief while c~t for the wrong reasons. was couect and lhe Board was inconect 
in grantinS the IIWldatory pooling for reasons of good faim. 
Since this Court has fOWld that the Board shoukl not have considered good faith, 
i~ will not ~ifically discuss mose issues since they are better left for Summit County. 
This Coun does not intend In make issues not before it resj'udicata_ Cercainly. ~howevef, 
there are issues which the Board did not address which were rdevant to any good fajth 
issue. 
IThe Chief'5 opinion does not state this as his n:ascm for denying the mandatory 
pooling,. but rather ~1eS that TOG failed to show thaI shey could not obtain sufficient 
1eues. lIis order is not deu what he means~ but his teStimony iDdiclre& that his research 
revealed that the lease with the bank was valid. 
5 
The decision of the Oil It Gas Boud is REVERSED. At she time the mandatoJy 
pooting request was made there were leases in effect, valid or not. which pJOvided a tract 
of land large enough to pzobibit the involuntary taking of Jand. The validity of the lease 
must be ~terrnilled in Summit County CommoJl Pleas Coutt. 
If the l~ are deemed invalid, there was 8J1other trK£ of land. the McCann 
propeny, on which the weD ~ou1d ha~ and .hould have been drilled. 1'his alone would 
preclude the mandatory pool.inB of Appellanu' property. 
Counsel for AppeUanT$ shall ~are and submit an appropriate Judgment 
Entry reflecting this Decision pursuant to Loc. Itc. 25.01 and 25.02. 
Appearances: 
Ronald ·S. Kopp. Esq. 
Scott Sa.1sbwy. Esq. 
Counsel for Appellant 
Kenneth L. GIbson, Esq. 
CoUD$e1 for Appellants 
Daniel H. PIQ:m1y, Esq. 
Susan Suer. Esq. 
Counsel for Appellees 
Jeffrey T. Knoll. Esq. 
Leonard W. Staufl'enger, Esq. 
Coun$d fen: Appellants 
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO 
NATIONAL CITY BANK, NE, 
Appellant, . . 
JflJMINATION NO (/ 
DY fiJlC ------
v. CASE NO. 94CV1I"-::m~I-'7"~-':'-___ . 
----
RICHARD J. SIMMERS, 
ACTING CHIEF, DIVISION OF 
OIL" GAS, OHIO DEPARTMENT 
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
Appellee. 
JUDGE TRAVIS 
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas. Pursuant to Local Rule 
39.01, upon the filing of this appeal, appellant was provided with a copy of the case 
scheduling order which set forth the briefing schedule and date of submission of this 
case to the court for decision. Pursuant to the case scheduling order, the record 
was to be filed on or before June 2, 1994; appellant's brief was due by July 17, 1994; 
appellee's brief by July 28, 1994; appellant's reply brief, and the date of submission 
to the court for decision, August 4, 1994. 
Appellant failed to file a demand for the record of proceedings. As. a 
result, no record has been filed. No briefs have been filed. Therefore, this appeal 
is DISMISSED for want of prosecution at appellant's costs. 
Copies to: 
Ronald S. Kopp, Esq. 
Scott Salsbury, Esq. 
Counsel for Appellant 
Richard J. Simmers 
Acting Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas 
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO 
NATIONAL CITY BANK, NE, 
Appellant, 
· 
· 
· 
· 
1fl1MINATIOrJ NU .... 'I 
Oy f}J1C ------
v. 
· 
· 
CASE NO. 94CV1P-::M~IJ1"-'- --_. ___ _ 
RICHARD J. SIMMERS, 
ACTING CHIEF, DIVISION OF 
OIL &: GAS, OHIO DEPARTMENT 
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
Appellee. 
· 
· JUDGE TRAVIS 
ENTRY 
This is an appeal pursuant to R. C. 119.12, from an order of the Ohio 
Department of Natural Resources, Division of Oil and Gas. Pursuant to Local Rule 
39.01, upon the filing of this appeal, appellant was provided with a copy of the case 
scheduling order which set forth the briefing schedule and date of submission of this 
case to the court for decision. Pursuant to the case scheduling order, the record 
was to be filed on or before June 2, 1994; appellant's brief was due by July 17, 1994; 
appellee's brief by July 28, 1994; appellant's reply brief, and the date of submission 
to the court for decision, August 4, 1994. 
Appellant failed to file a demand for the record of proceedings. As a 
result, no record has been filed. No briefs have been filed. Therefore, this appeal 
is DISMISSED for want of prosecution at appellant's costs. 
) C;-~ 
Copies to: 
Ronald S. Kopp, Esq. 
Scott Salsbury, Esq. 
Counsel for Appellant 
Richard J. Simmers 
Acting Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas 
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY" OHIO 
CIVIL DIVISION 
BRUCE DOOLmLE. et aI. ] 
Appe1lant. ] 
YS. I CASE NO. 94CVF02-839 
TIlANSCONTINENTAL on.. & GAS, 
INC., et aL ] JUDGE BESSEY 
Appellees. 1 
. -. 
DECISION 
Rendered thit ~ ~a,. or November 7 1994. 
Bessey; J. 
This ~8se is b=forc the Court on an R.C. '1509.37 appeal from the Decision of the 
Oil &: Ou R.eview Boud granting a mandatory PQoling order to Appellee. The Boud's 
Ded.sion reversed the Order of the Olief of the Division of on and Gas which had denied 
me request for mandatory pooling. 
1lle Court is confined to the record ptesented at the Board ~cept under the 
fonowing circumstances: 
ItThe court may gratlt a Mquest for the admission of additional evkience when satisfied 
that such additional evidcna: is newly discoYeted and could Dot with reasonable diligen<:e 
have been ascertained prior to the hearing before the board." R.C. ,1509..31. 
'l"ho, case file in the within «USC ~Qntains affida"iu, depositions. ex parte 
communications by letter to the Court. and allegations within the briefs which are ineither 
newly diSCOVered nor conWned wilhin the ~rd from the Board. To a great e:xsent they 
pciI1aiu ~ the tell~ case pending in Summit County Common Pleas Court between 
~ ., 
r •• ,---
.... "";. 
.' 
AppdlanlC and InterVenors in r.hia case. They compHcate the issues in this case 
unAeCeSsarily- The only issue before this Court is whether the Ordet of the Oil & Oas 
Board is lawful and reasonable. R.C. flS09.37.For the following reasons this Comt bas 
dctennined that it is nol On September 6, 1994, Jn1et\'eI1Of withdrew its appeal 
The property involved is loc:ated in Bath Township, Ohio. The portion which me 
Board ordered to be pooled is 3.067 ac:te. of a 13.48 aere U'aQt W'hich. was owned by 
GiUum H. Doolittle. DOW deQeased. Doolittle died testate leaving the property to his two 
children and his two graMchildml. Each child (the Appellanu berein) was to receive a 
1/3 interest and the gr8lldchildren e~h received a 1/6 interest -hich was to be held in 
mzst by the ttustoo National City Bank (NCB). However. the title to the prQPerty ntvtr 
passed to the beneficiarle5. but ratbel' was listed as still being owned by Doolittle. 
In 1991, Appellee, Transcontinental Oil &: Gas. Inc. (TOO), sought a lease 
r;;c)ncem.ing oil and gas rights on the DoolirtJe property. It was ultimately cnrc:red into by 
NCB as iIustee on December 12, 1991. NCB did not advise Appellants that the"y were 
taking this action. Before the lease was signed, TOG obtained a permit to drill an oil 
well near the Doolittle property in anticipation of the execution of the lease. In February, 
1 m. th~ ~11 was drilled to depth. After the well WI$ started. but before it was drilled 
.0 total depth, TOO bcame awate fhat NCB waS DOW questioning its authorlty to enter 
infO the lease as trU$tee because Doolittle and Engel (the children of Gillum DoolitUe) had 
voiced objec1ions. TOG proeeeded to drill to depth. cased, and Qpp:d the well TOO 
then aUetnpteci to negotiate a 'Voluntary pooling agreement with Doolittle and Engel but 
was unsua:es5fu1. It then appUed for a mandatol1 pooling order on June IS. 1992. 'The 
Chief denied the request on July 29, 1992. The Oil & Gas Review Board held its hearina 
z 
on the obFtions of TOC on October 22, 1992~ but did not iSsue its Order gtanti.o.g the 
mmdatDJ)' pooling request until Ianuuy 21. 1994. 
It.c. ,15(19.21 sets out the prerequisites for a mandatory poolin.S order: 
IIIf a tracr. of land is of insufficient si%e or shape to meet the 
requirementS for driUiug a well thereon u provided in 
section 1509.24 or 1$09.25 of the R.e\'1sed Code, whichever 
is applicable. IJ1d the owner has been unable for fozm a 
drilling lPIit under agreement provided. bl section 1509.26 
of the !tevised Code. on a just and equitable basis, the 
owne.r of such uact mal' make application to the division of 
oll and gas for a mandatoxy pooling Older. 
Such applieation shall indude such data and information as 
shall be reasonably required by the cbief of the division of 
on and ,as and shall ~ accompanied by an applkation for 
permit as required by section 1509.05 of the ReviscdCode. 
The chief shall notify aU owners of land withio the area 
proposed to be included within the order of the filing of 
such application and of their tight to a bearing if requested. 
After Ule hearing or after the expiration of thirty days from 
thL' .slate Dotice of application was mailed to such owners, 
the chief. if satisfied that the applicariol1 is proper in fann 
and that marulatoty pooling is necessary to protect 
oorrelative rights or to provide effective development. use. 
or conservation of oil and gas, shall issue a dri11i.a8 pennit 
and a mandatory pooling order complying with the 
requirements for drilling a weD as provided In sc:dion 
1509.24 or 1.509.25 of the Revised Code. whichever is 
applicable. which shall: 
(A) Designate the boundaries of the drilling unit within 
which lhe well shall be drilled; 
(B) Dcsigl'6lte the proposed drilling site; 
(C) Describe each se,parate1y owned tract or pan meteof 
pooled by the otde.r; 
(0) AUoc$te 011 a $\lJ'face acreage basis a pro I.ta portion 
of the production to the owner of each tract; 
(E) Designate the pa50D to whom the permit shall be 
issued. 
3 
Thus, l,mder the &tata!e, there are two prerequisites to a mandatory pooling order: 
L 1'he tract of land must be of inlllfflClent size 01 shape 
without mcluding the land sought to be peoled. 
2. The deYelopcr most have been unsuccessful in his 
_ttempts 10 get 'folunrary pooJing agreements. 
}Q1uJSon "r KeB (19931 I' Ohio App.34 623. 
The cvidcacc presented 10 me Board through Mr. Craddock indicated that there 
was another tract of land which TOG had pn:vicusly leased which would have been a site 
which was s\lfficient in me and $hapc to accommodate the well. This is the McCann 
property. This should have been the end of the inquiry sin~ the rust prerequisite for 
mandatory pooling was not mel 
While the Board in its opinion recognized the fact that the McCann property was 
sufficient in siu and shape.. it foWld that fact to be irrelevant sinc;c TOG had alretdy.gone 
to the expense of drilling the well on the Doolittlt::: ptopc:rty. The Board considered the 
site and shape of the u.ct of land on which the well had been drilled witbout the 
Doolittle property in granting the mandatoty pooling order. Thi.t is contrary to the statute 
which requires that the application. for mandator)' pooJin' accompany th8 permit to drill 
the well. It was not meant to protect those who drill a well improperly. The. BDard 
exceeded hs audlority in attempting to mitigate the damages that TOG would surfer. It 
also did not consider the adverse. effect the use of only three aq-es of the 13 coptained 
ill the Doolittle property would have en Appellants. For that reason alone. it did not 
prQ~t Appellants lt cottelativs ripts In violation of tho etaNte. }0'll1l6O". 8901t1D 
A".3d 41 621.U. In fairness to TOO, it did not anticipate needioS mandlltoIy pooling 
since it believed i~ bad a valid leJSe with NCB. It WAS at the point that the Appellants 
4 
quesdbtiiSd the iQdlwitl of the cum.et to eMXute the lease tftaf the-San.mt ee\tftty ease 
had to hive been resolved. That co\1It bas the only jurlsdiction to decide lhose matte:rS 
and the Chief and me Board bodl e"ceeded their a\lthority in considering die legality of 
the lease. TOG, absent an injunction against use of the ~el1, could have begun 
production.. There was DO need to go to the Chief for a mandatory pooling order since 
TOO already had existing voluntary leases the invalidity of which had not ba::u shown. 
The Chiers testimony at the hearing before the Board was that he beliC\'ed there 
was a valid lease in place as executed by the bank.l TOO should have operated under 
that premise and I;ontinued drilling or resolved that lawsuit in the Summit County 
Common Pleas Coun. The dUef felt tha.t the prerequisites were not there for mandatoty 
drilling since the lease had beea exccuted for the Doolitue property. The Chief should 
not have considexed the legality of the lease. His only inquiIy $hould have been wb.erher 
or not th~ was a lease which made the flaGt Jarge enough to preclude mandatory 
pooling. Nelthet the Board nat this Court has any jurlsdi~tion to decide the legality of the 
voluntary lease. That issue has to be resolved in Summit County. Thus. lhe dccfsion of 
die Chief while correct for the wrong reasons. was cottect and Ihe Board was inconcct 
in granting the mandatory pooling fot reasons of good faim. 
Since thjs Court has found that th~ Board should not have considered good faith, 
if. will not speQficllly discuss those issues since they are better left for Summit County. 
1bis Coun does not intend to make issue$ not before it resjudicaia. Certainly. howev~, 
there are issues which the Board did not address whkb were relevant to any BQOd faith 
issue. 
l1be Chic:fs opmion does not Jta1c this as his reason for denying the mandatory 
pooling,. but rather &tateS that TOO failed [0 show thaI shey could not obtain luffi~ient 
1cueB. I1is order is not cle..r what he means, but his testimony indicares that his research 
revealed that the lease with the baDk was valid. 
5 
The dedsioD of tho Oil & Gas Board is REVERSED. At the time the mandatory 
p!;JOling request WIs mad~ there were lease. in ~ valid or not, which pIOvided a ttact 
of land large onough to pmhibit the inVOllDltary raking of Janel. The validity of the lease 
musl be determined in Summit County Commoll Pleas Coutt. 
If the l~ are deemed invalid., there was Bl'lother trlK:t of land. the McCann 
propett;y, on which the well t;ould ha~ and should have been drilred. This alone would 
predude the maadatory pooliq of Appellanbl' property. 
Counsel for AppeUanu &hall prepare and submit an appropriaU! ludgmeD[ 
Batty reflecting this Decision pursuant to Loc. IU. 25.01 and 2.S.02. 
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